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Dr Nathan
Jon Emery
Royal
Society University Research Fellow (Gatsby Research Fellow)
+44 (0)1223 741811
nje23@cam.ac.uk
At the start of my research
career, I was a BBSRC funded PhD student working with Prof
Dave Perrett, in the School of Psychology, University
of St Andrews (1994-1997). During my PhD thesis, I recorded
from neurones in the anterior temporal cortex of rhesus macaques
that responded selectively to dynamic changes in the perception
of species, eye gaze direction, head direction, and intentional
motion (such as reaching towards a goal object). I measured
the eye movements of monkeys whilst they viewed videos of
conspecifics looking at one of two identical objects and found
that they were able to follow their eye gaze, to objects of
interest in the environment. I then worked for three years
as a post-doctoral research fellow with Dr David Amaral, at
the Center for
Neuroscience, University of California at Davis studying
the effects of excitotoxic lesions of the amygdala on social
interactions, hormones and personality in rhesus monkeys (1997-2000).
Contrary to previous studies, the amygdala lesions caused
dramatic increases in social affiliation and investigation
in relation to an unfamiliar conspecific during early encounters,
and when compared to normal control monkeys. I then went on
to work as a post-doctoral research associate at the Sub-department
of Animal Behaviour at University of Cambridge, working with
Prof. Barry Keverne on the role of the prefrontal cortex in
socio-sexual behaviour in common marmosets (2000-2002). Since
2002, I have been a Royal
Society University Research Fellow working on a long-term
project entitled "Social reasoning: evolution, cognition &
neurobiology". The various aspects of this research are described
below. avioural neuroscience and brain evolution.
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Research
Interests
Social
Intelligence
The
'social intelligence' hypothesis predicts that large-brained
social species will use complex cognitive strategies in their
social interactions, as seen in the formation of coalitions
and alliances in primates and dolphins. Many birds are extremely
social, congregating in large flocks or roosting in colonies.
The corvids, in particular display diverse differences in
social structure, and have large relative forebrain sizes.
We have been studying social knowledge in two groups of hand-raised
rooks (Corvus frugilegus), a colonial species. Juvenile rooks
form long-term alliances, which are based on high levels of
affiliative behaviour (preening, food sharing) between partners.
The rooks do not base their choice of partner on a predictable
pattern (i.e. is not always kin), and being in an alliance
increases the social status of both partners. Food sharing
was used in the formation of alliances, but switched to preening
for maintenance of the relationship. Sharing was initiated
and reciprocated. Food was also exchanged with other behavioural
'commodities', such as preening, and agonistic aid. The rooks
displayed 'redirected aggression', against the partners of
those individuals that had attacked their own partner. We
are continuing to quantify the complex social tactics used
by rooks and also jackdaws (Corvus monedula), comparing them
with those employed by monkeys, dolphins and apes.
Corvid
Cognition
We
are currently investigating social and physical cognition
in western scrub-jays, rooks, and jackdaws. Recent work in
our lab has shown that food-storing corvids utilise a number
of social strategies and counter-strategies to prevent their
food caches from being stolen by conspecifics or enhance their
opportunities for stealing caches themselves. We have shown
that scrub-jays utilise their own experience of pilfering
to engage in strategies to reduce the potential for pilfering
of their own caches. Jays without pilfering experience do
not do this, thereby presenting the best evidence to date
that a non-human animal has a 'theory of mind' (experience
projection). We have also found that jays use other cache
protection strategies, such as caching at a distance from
observers, hiding caches behind barriers, and caching in the
shade compared to bright light. Such strategies could be used
to reduce the amount of visual information available to potential
thieves. With respect to physical intelligence, we are studying
whether rooks, which have not been reported to use tools in
the wild, understand the properties of tools, and other aspects
of causal reasoning.
Corvid
Brain
We are currently investigating whether there is a correlation
between social complexity and brain size in corvids. Regions
of the avian brain thought to be analogous to the mammalian
neocortex (hyperstriatum ventrale and neostriatum) are being
measured in a variety of corvid species. The volume of these
brain regions will be correlated with average flock size and
social system (e.g. territorial versus colonial). Our long-term
aim is to a) perform histolgical analyses on a large sample
of corvids (cell counts, neural connectivity), b) produce
a stereotaxic atlas of a representative corvid brain, and
c) perform reversible lesions of these brain regions to determine
their effects on cognition.
Evolution
of Social Gaze
Following
another's gaze may provide low-level information about their
attention, intentions and knowledge state, and so may form
the basis for attribution of mental states ('theory of mind').
Much is already known about the cognitive and neural mechanisms
of social gaze in dogs, macaques, chimpanzees and humans,
however little is known about gaze following in other social
animals, such as New World monkeys, cats and birds. We are
currently investigating the use of social gaze in these animals,
particularly whether gaze can be recorded in birds due to
their increased peripheral vision.
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Teaching
6
lectures on Animal Cognition in M5 Behaviour module, Part II
Zoology
1. Evolution of Brain & Intelligence
2. Number, Tools & Causality
3. Social Intelligence
4. Social Cognition & Theory of Mind
5. Self-recognition
6. Symbols & Language
Sample
essay questions
1.
Has the brain evolved in parallel with intelligence?
2. What do animals understand about inanimate (e.g. tools) and
animate objects (e.g. conspecifics)? To what extent is this
understanding derived from similar psychological processes?
3. Describe how 'self-recognition' and 'theory of mind' might
be related.
4. Discuss the statement, "If a lion could talk, we would
not understand him" (Wittgenstein, 1958, Philosophical
Investigations).
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Publications
Please
click here for a full list of
my publications.
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